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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
AD VALOREM TAX EXEMPTION
The plaintiff, a non-profit corporation which operated a home for
elderly people, sought an ad valorem tax exemption pursuant to section
16, article XVI of the Florida Constitution.' The circuit court concluded
that the plaintiff's property was not held and used exclusively for either
religious, scientific, municipal, education, literary, or charitable purposes
and since it did not qualify as to any of the constitutional exemptions sin-
gularly, it did not qualify through a combination of any of the exemptions
collectively. On appeal, held, affirmed: "Since taxation is the rule and
exemption is the exception the Court is not inclined to enlarge by con-
struction, nor implication something that neither the Legislature nor the
framers of the Constitution have not written in clear and definite terms."
Presbyterian Homes of the Synod of Fla. v. City of Bradenton, 190 So.2d
771, 772 (Fla. 1966).
Generally, state constitutions and statutes which provide for exemp-
tions can be grouped under two major headings.2 First, where the exemp-
tion is bestowed directly upon the institution, and second, where the
exemption is conferred upon the property.'
At first glance, Florida's provision4 appears to be within the second
grouping-the exemption conferred on the land. However, earlier Florida
cases have emphasized both the character of the taxpayer under consid-
eration and the nature of the use to which the particular property is de-
voted.'
According to a strict interpretation of the "land use" exemption,
property is exempt only when the activity for which it is used has an
immediate and substantial relation to,6 and is held and used for,7 one of
the purposes stated in the exemption provision. Under Florida's consti-
tutional provision, property is exempted from ad valorem taxation if it
1. FLA. CoNsT. art. XVI, § 16: "The property of all corporations . . . shall be subject to
taxation unless such property be held and used exclusively for religious, scientific, municipal,
educational, literary or charitable purposes."
2. 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 281 (1954). See also Annot., 34 A.L.R. 645 (1925).
3. However, when state statutes are compared with the case law interpreting them, it is
evident that some courts have overlooked this distinction in some decisions while giving im-
port to it in others. For this reason it seems futile to try to classify the statutes and constitu-
tions into these clear divisions. Florida cases throughout this note shows typical treatment of
the problem referred to above.
4. FLA. CONST. art. XVI, § 16.
5. State ex rel. Burbridge v. St. John, 143 Fla. 544, 197 So. 131 (1940).
More recent cases seem to draw a clear distinction however. See State v. Inter-American
Center Authority, 84 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1955) (criterion for exemption is the character of use to
which property is put and not character of ownership) ; Dr. Wm. Howard Hay Foundation v.
Wilcox, 156 Fla. 704, 24 So.2d 237 (1945) (the use made of the property is the sole test of
exemption). An earlier case which seems to have made the distinction is Lummus v. Florida
Adirondack School, 123 Fla. 810, 168 So. 232 (1936).
6. City of St. Augustine v. Middleton, 147 Fla. 529, 3 So.2d 153 (1941).
7. Miami Battlecreek v. Lummus, 140 Fla. 718, 192 So. 211 (1939).
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is used exclusively for charitable purposes." The sole test to determine
whether there is to be an exemption should be the use made of the prop-
erty9 and the characterization of the owner as a charitable institution
should be immaterial.'"
In applying existing Florida law" to the instant case the supreme
court strictly interpreted the constitutional provision 12 by adopting in
toto the circuit court's conclusion that the property was not held and used
exclusively for any of the categories specified in the provision, and was
therefore not exempt from taxation.'" The dissent said that such a simply
and clearly stated majority holding would endanger "the tax exempt
status of every church-operated college, school or hospital in the state
which make any charges for services."' 4 However, the existing case law
in Florida does not substantiate this fear. The court has said that a char-
itable institution does not lose its charitable character nor its exemption
from taxation merely because the recipients of its benefits who are able
to pay are required to do so, so long as the funds so derived are devoted
to the charitable purposes of the institution.' 5 There is no reason to be-
lieve that this will not be the case in the future.'
The instant case partially satisfies the need for definitions in this
area of great public importance.
The theory upon which property of charitable institutions is ex-
empted from taxation is that their chief object is to care for those who
would otherwise become charges upon the state or burdens upon society.' 7
This is the theory upon which exemption has always been based' 8 and
coincides with the constitutional provision requiring a uniform and equal
rate of taxation.'9
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8. FLA. CONST. art. XVI, § 16.
9. State v. Inter-American Center Authority, 84 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1955) ; Dr. Wm. Howard
Hay Foundation v. Wilcox, 156 Fla. 704, 24 So.2d 237 (1945). (The use made of the property
is the sole test).
Florida treats the question of whether property is used exclusively for charitable purposes
as one of fact. State ex rel. Miller v. Doss, 146 Fla. 752, 2 So.2d 303 (1941).
10. 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 282 (1954).
I1. Haines v. St. Petersburg Methodist Home, 173 So.2d 176 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
12. FLA. CONST. art. XVI, § 16.
13. Presbyterian Homes of the Synod of Florida, Inc. v. City of Bradenton, 190 So.2d
771, 772 (Fla. 1966).
14. Id. at 773.
15. The majority is no doubt correct that "a charitable institution does not lose its char-
itable character and its consequent exemption from taxation merely because recipients of its
benefits able to pay are required to do so . . . ." Orange County v. Orlando Osteopathic Hosp.,
66 So.2d 285, 288 (Fla. 1953).
16. In the instant case it was found as a matter of fact that the property was not used
for charitable purposes. No doubt one of the ingredients of this finding was the payment of
the money. However, other facts were also present and it is certainly conceivable that an
opposite finding would result if any one of the factors present here does exist.
17. Supra note 2.
18. Supra note 2.
19. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1, provides for a uniform and equal rate of taxation except
as to such property as may be exempt by law for charitable purposes, among others.
